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Abstract
On the evening of November 8th, 2016, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced to a
shocked India that the two most common banknotes would thereafter cease to be legal tender.
Newly designed notes were printed and dispersed to Indians who were forced to wait in long
bank and ATM lines, which frequently ran out of cash due to such high demand. There were
reports of people dying in lines, not getting paid their salaries due to the chaos, and losing
everything in the resulting inflation that plagued rural farmers. Since then, India has seen a rise
in cash usage rates compared to pre-demonetization levels, coupled with a loss of precious GDP
and growth rates. On the flip side of the demonetization coin lies Sweden, the most cashless
society in the world, whose long transition to predominantly digital payment methods has been
accepted by most people. Many factors separate India’s demonetization from Sweden’s. To
analyze and compare these two countries that underwent demonetization efforts, their cultural
factors, such as uncertainty avoidance, preference for cash, jugaad, and political culture must be
studied in addition to the economic factors of the origin of change and income inequality. This
study shows that both cultural and economic factors contributed heavily to the origins and
impacts of demonetization events in India and Sweden.
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I. Introduction
Cash is inarguably one of the most important elements of an economy, but what happens
when a country reduces or nearly eliminates the use of cash notes? Both India and Sweden have
demonetized to varying degrees. India, in a government-led initiative, attempted to demonetize
in November 2016 when Prime Minister Modi surprisingly announced that the 500 rupee note
and the 1000 rupee note were no longer legal tender. This resulted in deaths while citizens waited
in long bank lines, a Reserve Bank which was busy printing newly designed bills and retrofitting
of ATMS for new bills, loss of GDP, and an ironic rise in levels of cash use once the initial shock
of demonetization lessened. In contrast, Sweden’s demonetization has been more organic and
market-driven, and has resulted in the most cashless society in the world. Many Swedes rely
heavily on app payments and credit or debit cards, hereafter referred to as digital payment
methods, to complete transactions. The transition has been slow and easily accepted by Swedes,
who rarely pay cash even for the smallest, everyday purchase.
Both Sweden and India underwent a period of demonetization, albeit with extremely
different results. The circumstances surrounding each country’s demonetization efforts were
different, and this has contributed to one country’s successful demonetization and another
country’s lack of success. The differences between Sweden and India’s demonetization efforts
can be divided into cultural factors and economic factors. The cultural factors include uncertainty
avoidance, jugaad, preference for cash and political culture. Economic factors include the origin
of change and income inequality. These variables are a result of reading a myriad of articles on
these topics and creating connections between the two events. This is a work of comparative
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political economy that also examines how non-state transnational actors, such as multilateral aid
agencies and philanthropic organizations, contributed to demonetization in India and Sweden.
The justification for choosing India and Sweden for this comparative case study of two
economies is twofold. First, India and Sweden are examples which do not seem to overlap in
reasons for demonetization, implementation, or outcomes. These are two diverse cases using the
criteria suggested by Seawright and Gerring (2008). Diverse cases are chosen with the objective
of achieving the most variation between cases (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p. 300). India and
Sweden show a full range of variation on both cultural and economic dimensions that contributed
to the causes and effects of demonetization. These cases are categorical and allow for easy
identification of diversity (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p. 297). More coherent conclusions can
be made to study the origins and implications of demonetization. Studying these cases also
contributes to the goal of creating more successful demonetizations in the future.
Second, other instances of demonetization were enacted to reduce inflation or a result of
a crumbling union, as in post-Soviet Russia, or the result or a new burgeoning union, as in the
European Union. India’s push for demonetization came from the top while Sweden’s came as a
result of the market gradually preferring digital payment methods. India’s case of demonetization
has greatly affected the economy and people’s everyday lives. Swedes, on the other hand, have
integrated digital payments into nearly all facets of their economy with great success. These
cases are unique in terms of demonetization.
The relationship between India and Sweden in terms of demonetization is extremely
complex. While both underwent demonetization, the origins and impacts of the events were
vastly different due to a variety of factors. These cultural and economic factors allow for
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comparisons to be made between the two countries and demonetization events. Comparing the
demonetization events in India and Sweden is important because these cases provide roadmaps
for what not to do in future demonetization attempts, as well as guidelines as to what is required
for a successful demonetization. Both efforts left some citizens behind, though India’s was far
more disastrous than Sweden’s. By looking deeply into the cultural and economic factors that
both contributed to the origins and impacts of demonetization, a clearer understanding of the
causes and effects are laid out and can be applied to future attempts. This paper answers several
questions: why demonetization was attempted in both countries, the initiatives themselves, and
what were the socio-economic impacts that contributed to the removal of cash from circulation in
both countries and its impact. Additionally, the main question answered pertains to why
Sweden’s demonetization was successful while India’s was not
1. What is demonetization?
Demonetization is the process in which monetary bills are taken out of circulation and
replaced with different notes or other forms of payment. In the case of India, the 500 rupee and
100 rupee notes, 86.4% of India’s currency (Mohindra & Mukherjee, 2018, p. 483), were
replaced with a newly designed 1000 rupee note and a new 2000 rupee note. In the case of
Sweden, bills gradually decreased in popularity and were slowly replaced by mobile payment
platforms. The country did revamp its currency and recall old notes, but this was to update
security features and make physical currency more environmentally friendly.
The reasons behind demonetization vary depending on a country’s situation. It can be a
market-based movement away from cash or an effort to combat tax evasion, cash used for
terrorism, counterfeit money, so-called “black money” by Narendra Modi, and to reduce crime.
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By recalling notes and replacing them with new designs, rates of taxation could increase and new
security features could be added to prevent counterfeiting. Demonetization also can be an effort
to introduce cash-heavy societies to traditional bank accounts and banking systems.
Demonetization transpired in the European Union, when governments fixed exchange
rates and demonetized old currencies before adopting the Euro. It also occurred in post-Soviet
nations, in Zimbabwe in 2015 to control hyperinflation, and the United Kingdom to varying
degrees of success. In countries which underwent rapid demonetization, such as Zimbabwe,
Ghana, and Myanmar, the goal was generally to fight hyperinflation. As a result of this quick
process without a stable government and a lack of infrastructure, riots and deaths occurred, and
Ghana in particular had a major economic downturn (Bose, 2019, p. 39).
Some demonetization attempts were due to the introduction of completely new
currencies, like the Euro or the variety of post-Soviet nation currencies, or to combat various
economic issues, such as low rates of taxation, counterfeit money, or an attempt to transition to
digital means of payment. In some countries, this transition has been more organically controlled
by the people or the market. In others, it has been a government initiative forced on to the
people. In the end, demonetization radically affects an economy and its participants.
II. India
India is no stranger to demonetization; it first had a currency ban just prior to
independence in 1946 and another in 1978 (S. Goel, 2018, p. 494). In 1946, the focus was on
capturing tax revenue from avoiders by targeting the Rs5000 and Rs10,000 notes, huge sums that
could only be obtained by the wealthy at that time. In 1978, the focus was on targeting black
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money; thus, the Rs1000, Rs5000, and Rs10,000 notes were removed from circulation (Bose,
2019, p. 38).
India is primarily a cash-based economy, with only 2-3% of expenses paid electronically.
In a small study, nine out of ten transactions at malls were made with cash (Sharma &
Fernandez, 2018, p. 15), reflecting the fact that 90% of transactions in general are cash-based
(Mohindra & Mukherjee, 2018, p. 486). India itself is a post-colonial country struggling to
maintain its rapid economic growth and democratic processes coupled with intense population
growth. Demonetization talks prior to Modi’s announcement could have gone both ways, they
could have either helped or hindered the burgeoning economic giant, depending on how the
initiative was planned and executed.
Demonetization in India could have had the potential to improve lives, lower costs, and
save money and time. By moving towards digital payments and credit or debit card use, India as
a whole could have saved man hours at banks and servicing ATMs. There would have been
fewer lines, money could have been changed or transferred faster, and banks and ATMs would
not have run out of cash. A cashless economy could have reportedly saved India .25% of its GDP
(Sharma & Fernandez, 2018, p. 16). As a populus hub of technology, India does have the
manpower and knowledge to create and implement a more extensive non-cash based system.
However, there are issues limiting proper and full implementation of demonetization, the most
stark being that a large portion of the population does not have access to banking institutions due
to the fact that they live in rural areas. Regardless, this did not stop a largely ill-planned
demonetization from being announced.
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On November 8th, 2016 around 9 PM, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced
to a surprised India that at midnight, the 500 rupee note and the 1000 rupee note would cease to
be legal tender. In an initiative called notebandi in Hindi, a new 500 rupee bill would be
designed in addition to the introduction of a completely new 2000 rupee note. In Modi’s words,
the demonetization effort was aimed “to break the grip of corruption and black money” and to
combat the hawala system, a traditional financial system involving cash brokers and connections
(Jost & Sandhu, 2000, p. 8) often used by extremist groups (Jain, 2016). Black money was and is
a term used by Modi to allude to cash used by terrorists or for criminal purposes that has avoided
tax collection (Mohindra & Mukherjee, 2018, p. 483). Subsequently, ATMs around the country
would be closed on November 9th and November 10th in order to retrofit the machines to fit new
bills and eliminate the Rs1000 space (Srivas, 2016). The Reserve Bank of India spent Rs79.65
billion printing the new Rs500 and Rs2000 notes (Sharma & Fernandez, 2018, p. 23).
1. The Days Before Demonetization and Interests in India’s Demonetization
Interestingly, the days before demonetization were neither a flurry of preparedness, nor
were they full of coordination across various Indian agencies in order to roll out the new policy
to India’s vast population, for whom 98% of transactions are completed in cash, or a whopping
68% of the total value of transactions (Jain, 2016). Rather, in the days before the implementation
of Modi’s demonetization plan the Reserve Bank of India (hereafter RBI) was printing massive
amounts of Rs500 and Rs1000 notes that would be discontinued in the coming days. On
November 4th, 2016, currency in circulation had increased to 17,970 billion rupees from 13,715
billion rupees, or 31%, since Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government assumed
office (Sharma & Fernandez, 2018, p. 22). The opposition to the BJP was not silent about their
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shock. Congress Party leader Palaniappan Chidambaram, also a former finance minister, stated
that in meetings with the RBI days before the demonetization decree, demonetization was not
mentioned, nor were designs of new notes or plans for the initiative drawn up. In addition,
Chidambaram indicated that the RBI rejected two justifications of demonetization, curbing
so-called black money and counterfeiting, but approved the decision just two hours before it was
announced (“Demonetisation:Congress says RBI meeting minutes proves bank’s disapproval of
decision”, 2019). Economist and philosopher Amartya Sen, often critical of Narendra Modi,
stated that demonetization was a despotic act which “undermines notes”, “undermines bank
accounts”, and “undermines the entire economy of trust”. He also claimed the government was
breaking promises to the people through this act (PTI, 2016).
Many parties internal and external to India have been interested in converting the country
from a cash-based society to one that relies mostly on cards or payment apps. In India, those who
benefit from a cashless system are Indian companies that benefit from digital payments like
Airtel and Paytm, the latter of which saw growth rise 18% in smaller towns following
demonetization. Larger retail chains with better access to digital infrastructure benefitted over
small cash-based stores. Big corporate farming entities benefitted from small farmers selling
their land and livestock in response to a loss of individual capital (Bose, 2019, p. 41).
The United States and US-based organizations have significant interest in
demonetization. The BTCA, the Better Than Cash Alliance formed in 2012, is a group
comprising governments, companies, and international organizations that try to hasten the
transition to digital payments to improve lives by reducing poverty. Members include prominent
organizations and companies such as USAID, Visa, MasterCard, and the Bill and Melinda Gates
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Foundation (Bose, 2019, p. 40). They are headquartered in the United Nations and intend to
grow digital payment systems without preference to a specific company or interface. This is all
under the goal of creating more inclusive spaces for business by opening up informal financial
spaces to women, rural communities, and the poor. Other claims are that exclusively digital
payments may help curb violence and provide more transparency and security, save money, and
promote financial inclusion (Better Than Cash Alliance, n.d.). Despite these intentions, there is
little proof that demonetizing helps open up informal spaces for the underprivileged, and claims
of no bias toward companies or interfaces will find it hard to be accepted when promoted by two
giants in the credit card world.
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is often mentioned when reading about
demonetization efforts around the world. In 2015, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s goal
was to implement a fully digital payment system in India and other developing countries by
2018. At a 2015 forum in Washington, D.C. organized by the U.S. Treasury Department and
USAID, Bill Gates remarked that “Full digitalization of the economy may happen in developing
countries faster than anywhere else...We have very significant efforts in Nigeria, Pakistan and
India, (and) a dozen other countries, where we work with the central banks to make sure that the
right kind of transaction switch is available” (Financial Inclusion Forum, 2015, pt. 17:23),
clearly showing the goals of the Foundation as well as a close relationship with Reserve Bank of
India. In the same speech, he stated that the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation worked with the
RBI over three years to create a new type of payments bank though which customers would be
able to use their mobile phones for basic financial transactions.
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Two years prior, in 2013, Raghuram Rajan from the International Monetary Fund became
the Governor of the RBI. He set up the Mor Commission, headed by Nachiket Mor, to address
issues of financial inclusion in India’s poor and rural areas. US-based groups linked to the Mor
Commission included the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. This commission worked on
getting Indians bank accounts, and linking them to the Aadhar identification card (Haering,
2017). The Aadhar card is an Indian national identification card that uses multiple forms of
verification, including biometrics, to ensure security. It has, however, been subject to data
breaches.
2. Corruption: the Bharatiya Janata Party and Narendra Modi
Narendra Modi’s personal brand was also a catalyst for demonetization. His own
ideology, and that of his political party, the BJP, is one of Hindutva, or Hindu nationalism. This
party is defined by its Hindu faith and extends that definition to the country. The party and Modi
are heavily connected to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a pro-Hindu nationalist
group of five million men. 60,000 clubs meet daily, exercising and discussing the latest political
issues (“Narendra Modi and the struggle for India’s soul—Orange evolution,” 2019, p. 19). Since
former RSS-leader Modi entered the political scene, more Hindutva initiatives have been
implemented, such as education reform to emphasize Hindu identity, ending policies that
advocated for the equal rights of Muslims, limiting the role of Sharia law, repealing special status
laws toward the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, building Hindu temples, and strongly
defending rules to protect cows. Even cities originally named by Muslim leaders have been
renamed to sound more Hindu and traditionally Indian by BJP politicians. For example,
Allahabad, originally named by Mughal emperor Akbar, was changed to Prayagraj.
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Unsurprisingly, the Congress Party, usually in opposition to the BJP, has adopted these policies
as well by diverting money in the name of cow protection and appearing for publicity at Hindu
temples around India (“Narendra Modi and the struggle for India’s soul—Orange evolution,”
2019, p. 18). Ideas that were once marginalized as extreme have become commonplace.
Thus, opposition to demonetization has become opposition to the BJP and Hinduism. The
recent elections in which the BJP gained more seats in the Indian legislative bodies, the Rajya
Sabha and the Lok Sabha, secured a second term for Narendra Modi, and only amplified
Hindutva and support for Modi’s policies. In terms of elections, demonetization could have also
been a dig at other political parties. Most Indian elections are conducted using cash as it is
untraceable, meaning the ability to bribe or coerce using cash is feasible. By eliminating cash as
an option and raising scrutiny of black money, Modi’s BJP slightly disadvantaged themselves but
mostly their political competition. Due to the BJP’s size and power, they were able to allocate
funds in different ways and get by without resorting to black money, whereas political
competitors were disadvantaged by demonetization.
3. Effect on People
Demonetization was rolled out on November 8th to shocked and unprepared Indians. In
the capital, New Delhi, the Rapid Action Force, or RAF, was deployed to manage crowds
(Srivas, 2016). Further complicating matters was the fact that many Indians lacked formal bank
accounts due to their living in rural areas far away from banking institutions, ability to function
easily without a bank account, or the lack of necessary paperwork required to open a banking
account. Between 32% and 46% of Indian adults have bank accounts, but many of them are
empty (Courier, 2017). 80% of women do not have bank accounts (Courier, 2017), and as many
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as 93% of rural areas in India are considered ‘unbanked’, meaning that those in rural areas
depend on banking correspondence, or a bank that acts as an intermediary or broker between
larger banks and smaller branches. While the government’s Jan Dhan Yojana initiative provided
bank accounts to 22.6 million Indians, many still did not have bank accounts, let alone access to
them, funds to deposit, or the documents to open them (Sharma & Fernandez, 2018, p. 18). Thus,
rural people, women, and those without documents were at a huge disadvantage from the
beginning of the initiative.
Following the decree, those with accounts, ample time, knowledge of the event, and bills
to exchange stood in lines at banks hundreds of people long, serviced by bank workers woefully
unprepared to exchange such high volumes of cash. Reports show that up to 150 people died
waiting in long lines to exchange their discontinued notes for new ones (Sharma & Fernandez,
2018, p. 44). Those who missed out on the exchange window were out of luck, including the
elderly, the less educated, and tribal people. Hoarding of still legal Rs100 notes skyrocketed and
people found ways around waiting in lines, often forcing others to wait for them. Day workers in
the informal sector were not paid for long periods of time. Demonetization may not have met its
goal of finding and collecting black money: 99% of bills were returned, signifying a lack of
counterfeit money floating around in India in the first place (Bose, 2019, p. 41). Following this,
Modi’s narrative seems to have shifted from curbing corruption and stifling counterfeit bills to
integrating India into the modern world by shifting Indians to more digital payment systems.
India was not, and is not, infrastructurally prepared to be cashless. Besides the huge
amounts of people who primarily use cash, the statistics associated with cash use in India’s rural
areas do not show proof of any ability to successfully transition to a demonetized system.
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According to economist and India expert Barbara Harriss-White, half of India’s villages do not
have electricity or are subject to power irregularities. Many Indians in rural areas do not have
internet access, despite the low cost of internet service, and thus many do not have access to
mobile banking or payment applications (Courier, 2017).
In terms of banking, out of a population of 1.3 billion, there are 740 million debit cards
and 27 million credit cards. Many of these cards lie dormant or are used sporadically for small
purchases (Courier, 2017). Another essential yet often overlooked element of banking was
India’s ATM system. 75% of India’s ATMs are in metropolitan areas and rural areas vary in ATM
density. ATMs in rural areas are often faulty due to a lack of repair and therefore can not be
trusted. In May 2016, months prior to demonetization, the RBI stated that out of a survey of
4,000 ATMs in India, “almost 1/3rd of the ATMs were found to be not working” (Srivas, 2016).
Post-demonetization ATMs required retrofitting due to the change in physical size between the
old notes and the new. On November 9th and 10th, 210,000 ATMs holding 17 billion rupees
worth of notes were serviced by a mere 35,000 workers all over India. However, demand was
much higher than supply, and the ATMs constantly ran out of bills. Further delaying the process,
a three-month period following the demonetization announcement occurred as India waited for
new notes to be printed (Ghoshal, 2017).
The Indian government layered another inconvenience, later made a loophole, on the
people: the maximum amount of rupees an individual could trade was Rs4,000, just over
$550USD at the time of writing. To get around this, people used “money mules”, or agents who
stood in line to change over small amounts to avoid suspicion by bank workers (Mohindra &

17
Mukherjee, 2018, p. 488). Policies were changed often as new problems arose or as loopholes
were discovered and corrected.
As a result of demonetization, Indians experienced a decline in health care. Many opted
out, delayed, or simply went without medical care due to rationing money, a total lack of money,
or not getting paid on time. Additionally, many experienced increased stress due to the chaos that
followed notebandi, with some committing suicide as a result of higher food prices and other
factors that contributed to a total loss of finances. The poor and those working in informal
sectors, often lower educated or lower caste, were the most affected, as they were more
dependent on their wages being paid in cash, which was hard for employers to disperse following
the announcement. Food consumption decreased as prices of food rose. Women, who often keep
a bit of cash stashed away for emergency, were especially harmed, as they had to give up their
hidden money or the money they had saved was suddenly worthless (Mohindra & Mukherjee
2018, p. 489). Responsibility often fell to employers at this time, who were told to open bank
accounts for their staff and train them in using electronic wallets, putting even more pressure on
workers to train other citizens or learn entirely new ways of buying things (Banerji, 2016).
The cash flow to workers in migrant or low-skilled jobs was restricted by the unmet
demand for replacement notes and some industries could have been eliminated. Other areas
affected were transportation, since highway toll operators refused to accept old banknotes,
choking flows of traffic across the country, and agriculture, which is generally affected by any
economic turmoil. All aspects of agricultural sales are cash-dependent, from the purchase of
seeds to the transport to markets,thus making it vulnerable to changes in currency (Sharma &
Fernandez, 2018, p. 28). These are just some of the problems on a sectoral level.
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4. Effect on the Indian Economy
Prior to the demonetization announcement, India’s GDP growth was at a high of 8.15% in
2015. By 2016, it dropped one percent to 7.11% and further dropped to 6.11% in 2017 (The
World Bank, 2019). This was likely a result of demonetization.
While demonetization efforts were initiated to expel black money, this effort was largely
unachieved. People most hurt were those in small businesses or employers; however, these
people were also the first to offer credit to fellow citizens after the demonetization crisis. Those
who had large amounts of black money were presumably knowledgeable in how to transfer this
money to offshore banking accounts. In fact, large amounts of bills were returned to the RBI,
suggesting that demonetization as a way to combat black money may not have been the true
motive.
With eerie accuracy, former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh offered some predictions
about demonetization that later proved prophetic. A former economist, Singh suggested that
demonetization would harm agricultural growth and negatively affect small industry and the
informal sectors of the economy. He predicted that GDP growth would decline by 2%. He
ultimately stated that demonetization was “organized loot and legalized plunder” (“”, 2016).
The government did report success, however, in a series of seven points. The tax base
was increased by 17.3%, which would now provide India with more funding. The collection of
advance tax grew by 41.79%, a success since the Modi government claimed that $10 billion in
unpaid income tax was due by 2016 (Anand & Kumar, 2016). The cash to GDP ratio fell, which
may hint at the success of digital payments, though this would prove false as the cash use rate
became higher post-demonetization. Investigations were launched into people with high value
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properties who had not paid their income tax, shell companies, and properties under which the
registered name is not the beneficiary. The government also said that it was looking into those
who deposited over Rs200,000 during the demonetization adjustment period over concerns that
such amounts signal black money (Bose, 2019, p. 45). According to Sharma and Fernandez, the
stock market was negatively affected as well. The BSE SENSEX went down 1,689 points, while
the NIFTY 50 decreased by 541 points (Chandrakar, 2017, p. 117).
In mid-November 2016, the Modi government released a survey regarding attitudes
towards the demonetization effort. There was a catch, however; the survey was only accessible
via smartphone on the Narendra Modi App. Questions were asked about a range of issues
pertaining to demonetization, such as whether or not it was beneficial and to whom. Survey
takers could not answer with any disagreeing statements, as the survey items did not allow for
such responses. Unsurprisingly, the results of the survey showed overwhelming support for
demonetization, which the Prime Minister used to validate the program and congratulate himself
on a job well done, saying that 92% of people who took the survey supported his efforts. The
survey was absolutely a farce considering that it targeted a tiny percent of India’s population:
those with access to smartphones, so only about 17% of Indians, those with adequate digital
literacy to download and use apps, and those who feel the need to download the Prime Minister’s
app in the first place. From his survey, it is clear that among wealthier, digitally-literate BJP or
Modi supporters, approval for demonetization runs high (Daniyal, 2016).
Today, only a few years later, large withdrawals and deposits of cash must be explained
by bank customers. Cash transactions of over Rs 200,000 have been made illegal, and any cash
transaction over Rs 50,000 requires the government-issued ID card, the Aadhar card.
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Additionally, there is discussion of whether or not to look into trading of other assets like gold
(Bose, 2019, p. 44).
In a speech that reflected the most recent views of demonetization and echoed his past
views, former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated on September 1st, 2019 that
demonetization as a policy was “all-round mismanagement”. He worried about the slowing
economy and GDP despite India’s potential to grow faster. Singh cited certain worrying
statistics: the manufacturing sector’s growth had slowed to 0.6%, consumption was at an
18-month low, and GDP growth was at a 15 year low. Jobs were lost in the automobile sector
and, while there are not hard statistics to back it up, the informal sector must also be facing
joblessness. Taxes are still not being paid. Singh states that “rural India is in terrible shape” as
prices and incomes for farmers have decreased, while a low inflation rate hurts farmers as well.
Interestingly, Singh mentioned that the autonomy of the RBI has deteriorated and confidence in
the Indian economy has been shaken. He closed with a call to action for the Modi government:
“Our youth, our farmers and our farm workers, entrepreneurs, and the marginalised section
deserve better. India cannot afford to continue down this path. Therefore, I urge the Government
to put aside vendetta politics and reach out to all sane voices and thinking minds to steer our
economy out of this man-made crisis” (ET Online, 2019).
Why did India undergo demonetization when the benefits have not been as clear cut as
they were made out to be? Clearly, international interest in creating a cashless India, whether
philanthropic, capitalist, or both, was a catalyst. Domestic issues, such as Modi’s Hindutva
policies and need for control over India and Indian politics, played a role as well. India’s
demonetization was a government effort from the very top pushed on a population and that was
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not remotely prepared for the massive upset it would cause to their lives. The repercussions of
such a political act are still rippling to this day, and they will for years to come. India may never
recover from an effort that was alleged to be a minor inconvenience for the greater good, but has
not lived up to expectations for the majority of Indians. Compared to Sweden’s experience, the
difference is stark.
III. Sweden
Sweden is the world’s pilot program when it comes to cashlessness, due to its high trust
in the government, a history of technological advances, and popular acceptance of those
technological advances. The Nordic country’s demonetization journey has been slow and steady,
initially dominated by innovation extending to the market and laypeople, then via policies
adopted by the Swedish government for the banking sector. That being said, there are societal
costs to cashlessness that have prevented Sweden from completely converting to a cashless
society, though that is a future that does not seem so far away.
Sweden is the closest example the world has today to a nearly completely cashless
society, though it was the first country in Europe to introduce notes in 1661 (Russell, 2014).
Swedish busses do not accept cash, nor can one buy a ticket for the Stockholm metro in cash.
Retailers are allowed by law to refuse coins or notes as long as there are signs near the entrance
or register indicating their refusal (Skingsley, 2018). Street vendors and churches prefer to use
cards or payment apps. 900 of Sweden's 1,600 bank branches do not keep cash or accept cash
deposits and many do not have ATMs. Circulation of the Swedish krona has dramatically
decreased since 2009 (Henley, 2016).
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Today, 20% of consumer payments in Sweden are made in cash compared to about 75%
in the rest of the world (Henley, 2016), and in stark contrast to India, where 98% of consumer
payments are made in cash (Jain, 2016). Physical money represents just 1% of the Swedish
economy, with only one in 10 people making cash purchases in 2018. Young people are much
more likely to shy away from cash: upwards of 95% of their spending paid with cards or digital
payment apps (Alderman, 2018). According to the Riksbank, the central bank of Sweden, less
than 2% of Sweden’s economy is represented by cash with that figure forecasted to drop to 0.5%
in 2020. The start of demonetization in Sweden may have been in the 1960s when banks
convinced employers and workers to use digital money transfers for wages. In the 1990s, credit
and debit card use was boosted as many banks started to charge for checks (Henley, 2016).
The decline in cash use was also initiated by a string of robberies on busses, after which
bus payments became digital. Since then, many banks have also become digital, relying less and
less on cash or refusing to deal with cash in general. Banks report that they are saving money on
security and that the incentive to commit cash robberies has nearly been eliminated (Savage,
2019). The data suggest that cashlessness may make banks safer: in 2008, 210 banks were
robbed compared to 2 banks in 2017 (Alderman, 2018). In a country like Sweden, the home of
music streaming service Spotify and addictive mobile game Candy Crush, digital payment
application innovation is easier than elsewhere and has a more receptive audience. A payment
app called Swish is used almost everywhere and the Swedish central bank is looking into
creating a new state-issued digital currency called the e-krona, which is independent from Visa
and Mastercard and hopes to quell fears of digital payments’ vulnerability to hacking. Sweden
has strong access to internet coverage, even in rural areas, and Swedes have a deeper trust in

23
institutions and new technology (Savage, 2019). Additionally, tax revenue has also increased
since payments made electronically leave a trail.
To add a further futuristic element, thousands of Swedes have injected tiny microchips
the size of a grain of rice into their hands, just above the thumb, as a way to pay for purchases,
unlock doors, store travel tickets on Swedish railways, share social media files, and store
emergency contact details with little more than a flick of the wrist. At a cost of about $180 and
with minimal pain, proponents espouse the fact that the chips are protected from hacking, though
there are concerns over what data is stored on the devices regarding health. One company which
produces, markets, and installs the chips is called Biohax, started by Jowan Osterlund. Osterlund
credits a culture which nurtures and values technology with the lack of apprehensiveness towards
the chips. Additionally, his statements echo those in this paper: that Swedes may be less worried
about privacy due to a high level or trust in companies, the government, banks, and government
institutions (Savage, 2018). While still not commonplace, the ability to implant payment
technology directly into the body speaks volumes about how different India and Sweden are
when it comes to acceptance of digital payments and radical technological advances.
The shift to near cashlessness has not been completely positive, however. In 2014, the
Swedish Ministry of Justice registered 140,000 electronic fraud cases. Those who lobby for
security firms for cash transfers accuse the banks and credit card companies of trying to
manipulate the market in favor of cards and digital payments, which generate fee income unlike
cash. Others are worried about government monitoring and the fact that their payments,
including the price and where it was paid, can so easily be tracked (Alderman, 2015).
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A group called the Kontantupproret, or Cash Rebellion, claims there is a conspiracy
between Sweden’s banks to eliminate cash and links demonetization in this manner to loss of
privacy and individual freedoms. Many groups may also be affected by a transition to a cashless
system: the less tech-savvy elderly, the disabled, and migrants who are used to using cash in their
home countries. Migrants may have a distrust in institutions stemming from experiences in their
home lands and are often the last to commit to cashlessness. Regardless of the shift to digital
payments, the Civil Contingencies Agency, responsible for preparing Sweden for a variety of
crises, still advises that cash be kept in small amounts at home in the event that payment systems
collapse (Orange, 2019). A shift to total cashlessness would pose an existential crisis to the
central bank. Additionally, individuals would be left to rely solely on the private sector to gain
access to money and digital payment methods (Skingsley, 2018). In a society which has great
trust in the government and banking systems, this could change Sweden in radical ways.
There has been pushback to cashlessness recently, reflected by the fact that in 2018 the
amount of physical cash in circulation increased for the first time in more than 10 years. This can
be largely attributed to representation by seniors groups and those which represent the more
vulnerable in Swedish society. Many have complained that they are not opposed to cashlessness
itself, but just the rapid speed with which it was adopted by Swedish banks, the government, and
merchants (Detrixhe, 2019). To add another layer of confusion to those already weary of
adopting digital payment methods, the Riksbank overhauled its currency just as digital payment
apps were gaining popularity.
In 2008, the Riksbank, following a survey given to residents in Sweden, decided to
reexamine and revamp its banknotes and coins with the goal of creating new, more secure
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designs that were more environmentally friendly (Riksbank, 2018, p. 6). The goal was to finish
this project in 2017. Several coins were withdrawn from circulation and replaced with newly
designed coins that were smaller, weighed less, and did not contain nickel, a chemical harmful to
the environment and to those allergic to it. Banknotes were withdrawn, made more secure,
formatted to be smaller, and newly designed. After June 30th, 2017, all banknotes and coins were
rendered invalid, though the Riksbank had launched comprehensive campaigns previously to
ensure that the populace was well informed. Given that the initiative had started 9 years prior,
there were no serious issues. By December 31st, 2017, 92% of the old banknotes and 52% of the
old coins had been returned (Riksbank, 2018, pg. 7). Subsequent surveys showed a drop in the
use of physical cash in general. Given that Swedes do not consistently use large quantities of
money on a regular basis, the initiative to overhaul the currency for security and environmental
purposes went off without a hitch. This was due to the long time in which the changeover took
place, nearly 10 years, the simple fact that people do not use cash often, the inclusion of the
Swedish people’s perspectives in surveys pre and post-overhaul, and the substantial information
campaigns waged by the Swedish government.
Sweden’s shift to near cashlessness seems almost natural. It was a response to increased
tech, a trust in the system, and a desire to prevent theft. While the Swedish banks did eventually
respond with regulations that furthered the cashless agenda, the cashless movement seems to be
embraced by the majority of Swedes and there is no sign of going back to using cash any time
soon.
Unlike India, demonetization in Sweden was a decision adopted by the market and
supported by the government. India’s demonetization was forced from the top. Besides the fact
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that both countries transitioned to a more digital payment system, using credit and debit cards
and payment apps in place of bills and coins, the similarities end there. Therefore, the following
questions are presented: Why were the results of demonetization vastly different in India and
Sweden? What are the factors in both countries which, in Sweden’s case, facilitated
demonetization and in India’s case caused damage in nearly all sectors of public and private life?
IV. Discussion
The factors that differentiate and explain demonetization in India and Sweden can be
divided into Two groups: cultural and economic. Cultural factors include uncertainty avoidance,
jugaad, preference for cash, and political culture. Economic factors include the origin of change
and income inequality.
1. Cultural Factors
Demonetization is an economic event, but only superficially. The reasons for
demonetization as well as the responses to it and its results are rooted in cultural factors. Without
considering how cultural factors contribute to the differences between India and Sweden and
their demonetization events, only half of the story is told. Uncertainty avoidance, jugaad,
preference for cash, and political culture must be taken into account when considering the
differences between these two countries’ demonetization efforts.
A. Uncertainty Avoidance
Following India's demonetization, mobile payments were adopted at higher rates over
traditional credit and debit cards due to the introduction of low-cost internet and an increased
risk perception that payment cards could be stolen. Post-demonetization Indians rushed to digital
transactions to fill the void left behind by cash, resulting in a 300% rise of digital transactions
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and a 435% increase in traffic to one payment app in particular, Paytm (Pal & Herath, 2018, p.
3). Several factors contributed to the rise: many existing mobile payment apps offered discount
codes or cashback, there was a drop in internet access prices, and unlike credit and debit cards,
mobile payment apps have yet to suffer wide scale security violations. The perceived low risk
that payment apps have may be due to their novelty and a lack of media reporting on hacking of
payment app services, but it is certainly linked to the concept of uncertainty avoidance.
Uncertainty avoidance (hereafter referred to as UA) is a measurement between 0 and 100
regarding the extent to which people become nervous or threatened by uncertain situations. This
means that countries whose scores are lower are more likely to accept and use new technology
faster (Pal & Herath, 2018). It can help us understand how a society, or in this case, country,
tackles an unknown future: do they deal with ambiguity by responding with nervousness and
avoidance or do they attack it head on?
India scores 40, suggesting a medium low score. This means that tolerance for the
unexpected is high and imperfection is accepted. According to Hofstede Insights, the
organization which conducts research regarding UA, a low UA score may manifest itself in an
acceptance of routine without question, but also an ability to skirt around rules. Indians may be
less worried about new technology and more likely to adopt it, as they were post-demonetization.
Circumventing official rules occurred as in the practice of using money mules in order to avoid
waiting in long lines or converting cash to gold. Not many in power really questioned Modi’s
decree; they may have complained, but demonetization continued without much backlash from
government officials.
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Interestingly, Sweden scores just 11 points below India with a UA score of 29. Lower UA
countries are said to have a more relaxed attitude and may deviate from the norm. Here, rules are
kept in place only if necessary and functional and innovation is accepted (“Country
Comparison,” n.d.). Sweden’s reputation as a technological innovator reflects this, as does its
willingness to cut out cash as a result of higher robberies and lack of use.
While UA is not the only predictor of why both countries eventually went through
demonetization and their response, it does give insight into how Sweden and India responded to
their unique events. A component that is essential to any country attempting demonetization is
technology already in place, and UA is connected to acceptance of technology, according to a
study (Straub, Keil, & Brenner, 1997, p. 1). Straub et al. 1997 studied how people from different
cultures with different UA scores use communicative technology at work: via traditional media
or computer-based media. Their results indicated that cultures in which UA is high “are expected
to use electronic media less often” (Straub et al., 1997, p. 4) because of a perception that
face-to-face communication reduces uncertainty. The conclusion is that workers from high UA
cultures may perceive computer-based media as less useful or harder to use (Straub et al., 1997,
p. 11). While at the time the media being studied was likely email or instant messages, the results
reflect current times and the latest technologies.
With Sweden being an early innovator with various technologies and apps, their low UA
designation is far from surprising. Sweden’s high rate of use of technology and acceptance of
cashlessness is due, in part, to their low UA score and perceptions of change. India is a bit
trickier to figure out. India had a difficult time adjusting to a world post-demonetization, but
eventually caught on to payment apps and adjusted accordingly, though the return to cash shows

29
that a strong preference for cash is hard to shake off. Their medium low UA score indicates that
while Indians may find it easier to adjust to uncertainty in their lives, they may also have slight
issues accepting new technology such as payment apps. In addition, their medium-low score
indicates that Indians may attempt to twist and bend the rules, which was clear in the
announcement of demonetization and near-daily rule changes and a mindset that the rules can be
navigated around.
Both countries adjusted to demonetization by accepting new technology, though
Sweden’s transition has been met with less resistance and was an effort initiated mostly by the
people. India’s adjustment period was rough due to the added dimension of converting old notes
to new notes at banks and as an effort sprung upon them literally overnight. Sweden’s lower UA
score suggests a country more likely to transition with greater ease to digital payments and an
enthusiasm for compliance with rules that they deem just. India’s medium low score has allowed
them to transition due to a cultural attitude that emphasizes being open to adjustment, but it has
also hindered the acceptance of demonetization due to cultural norms that allow for rules to be
skirted. Thus, in concurrence with its very low UA score, Sweden’s demonetization effort was
widely accepted in the beginning and followed through with few issues, in contrast to India.
Uncertainty avoidance absolutely contributed to how India and Sweden responded
differently to demonetization. UA alludes to another cultural factor, but this one is uniquely
Indian: jugaad. UA and jugaad are both associated with adaptation to situations based on what
one has and thus they complement each other in the context of demonetization.
B. Jugaad (“Making Do”)
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Jugaad is a form of innovation that maximizes the use of everyday objects to transform
them into much-needed objects, such as transportation, support systems, etc. Everyday objects
are used to solve problems when resources are limited. It can even be a euphemism for
corruption, implying the use of social networks to gain connections (Jauregui, 2014, p. 76). The
key to understanding jugaad is that, when given limited financial, physical, or relational
resources, one improvises with whatever they have been given to advance their goal, be it
creating a vehicle from scrap metal or bribing someone in power to obtain a promotion. It is
associated with being resourceful. The way one uses jugaad is very much dependent on the
position they occupy in the world. Jauregui references Molekhiet’s writing in describing jugaad:
“one is for the privileged city-slicker who uses it to bend laws or work around his problems; and
the other, more importantly, for the less privileged where Jugaad is the means to their survival”
(Jauregui, 2014, p. 77). There are at least two types of jugaad: one which is required when faced
with adversity and making do with what one has, and another which is a form of corruption used
by the privileged to secure power.
In an article about her experiences post-demonetization, Ranjona Banerji writes about
how jugaad comes into effect in times like these: “A local trader, meanwhile, is offering an
exchange scheme – Rs100 off every Rs500 or Rs1000 note. The great Indian jugaad (making do)
always comes majestically to the fore at times like this” (Banerji, 2017). Other accounts show
how creative Indian jugaad was used to bypass government rules and to make life a bit easier in
trying times. Instead of waiting in long lines, bank customers wanting to exchange notes took off
their footwear and placed it in line, freeing them to sit nearby, play games, or enjoy a cup of chai
while waiting for their spot in line to be serviced. Other customers placed the necessary
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documents on the ground, held in place by a brick or rock, marking their place in line
(“Demonetisation effect,” 2016). Those who could not afford to wait in line but could afford a
surrogate to stand in their place at the bank used apps to find day laborers willing to wait in line
for between Rs40 and Rs150 per hour as a proxy (“Demonetisation ‘jugaad,’” 2016). A loan and
banking app called Money View quickly identified a much needed service: an app that could
help users locate ATMs that still had cash. This component of their app was built quickly to
address their customers’ needs. User-driven, the app allows for immediate updates of ATM
locations which have yet to run out of cash and also provides estimates of the length of lines
(Shah, 2016). These examples show innovation used to ease stress and maximize time when
given circumstances that are out of one’s control. However, greater examples of the more corrupt
version of Indian jugaad arose when avoiding demonetization and attempting to skirt around the
law whenever possible.
Examples of avoiding depositing money and thus avoiding suspicion of being associated
with black money are rife. A real estate developer in Vadodara paid his employees six months of
salary in advance, an ingenious way to get rid of Rs500 and Rs1000 notes to unsuspecting day
laborers. Others who have hoarded large notes hired middlemen who charge commissions to
exchange notes but avoid government suspicion. Some ran to the jewellers to purchase large
amounts of gold, investing their potentially black money into physical goods that could be sold
for legitimate notes once the hype of demonetization wore off. More malicious were those who
ran off to religious institutions, exchanging Rs500 and Rs1000 notes with smaller notes as
donations (Dave, 2016). Others purchased train and flight tickets only to cancel them and seek
refunds in new notes (Shekhar, 2016). These are just a few examples of the more malevolent,
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corrupt version of jugaad, though still uniquely Indian solutions to the problems faced by many
following the demonetization announcement.
Demonetization had at least one clear goal when it was put forth by Modi: address tax
evasion and increase tax revenues by increasing the tax base. Whatever might transpire would be
either collateral damage or benefits to the policy, but tax revenue was the primary driver of
demonetization. Talukdar brings up an interesting point: that the government had a skewed
version of reality. He writes that the government “underestimated the innate Indian talent for
jugaad” and that “meta-corruption seems to be at work” (Talukdar, 2016). Subsequent
addendums and revisions to the original demonetization rules were common; more than ten rules
were changed or put in place just one week after demonetization was announced (Shekhar,
2016). These revisions were made to address the jugaad people were employing to bypass rules
and regulations, creative solutions that the government did not anticipate.
To address the problems that arose and to attempt to close the loopholes innovative
jugaad users had been abusing, the Modi government instituted ten changes. Exchange limits
were restricted from Rs4,000 to Rs2,000 per card per day, then back to Rs4,000. Withdrawal
limits in banks and ATMs were increased. Exemption dates in which old notes must have been
exchanged for new notes were pushed back from November 14th to November 24th, and made
even longer for those receiving pensions. Exemptions were made for many industries that were
allowed to continue collecting old notes until November 14th. Upon reports of long, deadly lines,
the government requested that banks set up separate lines for the elderly and differently-abled.
Indelible ink, the ink typically applied to voters’ fingernails after casting their vote, was used
now for those who had deposited their limit of notes. Jan Dhan accounts, part of an initiative to
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give the poor bank accounts, were now being used only to deposit unusable notes and thus were
given deposit limits. Lastly, but certainly not the only later change made by Modi, surveillance
footage of jewelry shops was demanded to target those who attempted to creatively get around
the law by turning their black money assets into gold (Shekhar, 2016). These are some, but not
all of the changes made in response to jugaad post-demonetization.
Corruption, demonetization, and jugaad are softly linked. Demonetization, according to
some, was an effort made by Modi and the BJP to root out black money from his opponents,
making it easier for his party to campaign and win elections. Demonetization was, in its own
way, a form of jugaad by the Modi administration to win elections using their connections to
create an ideal reality. Jugaad in this case involved using one’s connections and power to achieve
a goal, which in this case was winning elections.
Culturally, jugaad may have roots in Indian philosophy and even connections to the
aforementioned uncertainty avoidance. Comparing Abrahamic and Indian Dharmic systems of
thought, R. Jagannathan, an Indian journalist, wrote
In the Abrahamic system, it is criminal to evade tax. Thus, you are a good guy if
you pay tax, and a bad guy if you don’t. The outcome is binary. In the Dharmic
mindset that most Indians operate in, we both pay taxes and attempt to evade
them, depending on what we think is just and acceptable. Tax is a matter of
individual judgment and negotiation. Punishment for not paying tax is karmic –
outside the ambit of the state (Talukdar, 2016).
Jugaad in its more concrete manifestation, as in creatively finding ways to go around laws,
obtain jobs or power, or otherwise get what one wants, has deep roots in subconscious thought.
We can examine Jaganathan’s quote through the lens of what happened after demonetization:
laypeople, faced with a chaotic, disjointed policy pushed on them from those at the very top,
perhaps thinking that it was unjust and unacceptable, did what they could to individually judge
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and negotiate what they perceived as fair. According to them, in the end, the state does not
necessarily judge those who avoid paying tax or otherwise going through the trials of exchanging
unusable notes for usable ones; it is the universe via karma that will take care of any committed
wrongdoing. This is specific to India and helps us understand why demonetization was met with
such difficulty there: innovating against the system was par for the course, and those with power
were shocked to suddenly, potentially, be held accountable for their actions and made to pay
taxes.
By using one’s social connections or creative innovations, rules and regulations are
bypassed and creative ways of achieving goals are achieved. Demonetization was itself a form of
jugaad to fight campaign corruption on “the other side”, or against political parties that work
with black money to gain votes in elections against the Modi administration and the BJP.
Post-demonetization was a perfect example of the ingenuity of the Indian people dealing with
crises unexpected by the government. Jugaad was shoes in place of bodies in line, app
developers working around the clock to provide services that found unique answers to everyday
people’s problems, and even the unlawful behavior of black money holders who attempted to
bypass demonetization legislation.
Jugaad explains why India was so hard-hit by demonetization in the first place. The
attitude of “it will all work out” or “it may sting now, but it is for the greater good” is often used
regarding demonetization in India. This was evidenced when Deepak Parekh, chairman of a large
mortgage lender called the Housing Development Finance Corporation, said that “it will be
disruptive, it will be inconvenient, but in the medium term, it will be very good” (Anand &
Kumar, 2016). However, data from an online poll conducted by Huffpost found that the number
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of people who said that the “pain of demonetisation was worth the state aim” was falling quickly
among the poor and middle class, and slowly among the rich (Talukdar, 2016).
Jugaad is so prevalent that it is expected for average Indians to make it work despite their
circumstances, just as they have in all aspects of their lives, social and professional. The attitude
that everything would be fine led to a hastily made decision backed up by the expectation of
jugaad- that India would find its way. The short-term repercussions for many Indians were
unacceptable, and surely the idea of the greater good hurt those Indians who lost family members
in long bank lines, those whose farm crops failed to sell, or those who failed to get their salaries.
The website Hofstede Insights writes this about India:
a word used often is “adjust” and means a wide range of things, from turning a
blind eye to rules being flouted to finding a unique and inventive solution to a
seemingly insurmountable problem. It is this attitude that is both the cause of
misery as well as the most empowering aspect of the country. There is a saying
that “nothing is impossible” in India, so long as one knows how to “adjust”
(“Country Comparison,” n.d.)
The Hindi word the author implies is jugaad, and this quote clearly reiterates that jugaad attempts
to overcome huge problems by adjusting; using innovation to overcome whatever difficulty is
being faced. Indeed, nothing is impossible in India, including overnight demonetization of over
one billion people, many of whom exclusively use cash and lack true access to formal banking
systems. For these people, adjustment on a grand scale is needed, which is where the widespread
cultural idea of jugaad comes into play.
Sweden does not have an analog for jugaad. As mentioned previously, its very low UA
score indicates that laws which do not work for all will simply be eliminated or changed. Sweden
has the infrastructure and social welfare system to ensure that a safety net such as jugaad is not
needed. Thus, their transition to a more cashless economy was smoother and less fraught with

36
cases of individuals attempting to work around the law. It was accepted as a fact of modern life
and adopted by most. Jugaad is a powerful tool that can be used for good or bad. It is certainly
something that Sweden and India do not have in common and thus differentiates India and
Sweden ‘s experiences with demonetization.
C. Preference for Cash
Different societies have different attitudes towards cash which may make it easier or
more difficult to implement digital payment methods. While cash may be a burden to a nation’s
economy, it still reigns supreme globally, accounting for about 75% of daily transactions
(Henley, 2016). Proponents of cashless systems argue for the security, efficiency, boost to
economic growth and inclusivity of digital payment methods, but some countries still lag behind
in their adoption of cashless systems. In a technologically modern country such as Japan, which
has the infrastructure to mobilize a cashless society, cash is still supreme. This is due to a cultural
preference for cash (Thomas, 2014).
MasterCard, associated with the Better than Cash Alliance, is obviously a proponent of
cashless payment systems. Their study, “Measuring Progress towards a Cashless Society”, splits
33 nations into 4 categories based on their position on the cashless timeline: inception,
transitioning, tipping point, and advanced. Inception countries are so-called developing nations
in which 90% or more of all transactions are made in cash. Inception countries are said by
Mastercard to use cash due to cultural preferences, low financial inclusion rates, or low cashless
infrastructure. As discussed earlier, India pre-demonetization had cash transaction rates in the
upper 90th percentile, making it a part of this inception group. The report by Mastercard says this
about inception countries transitioning to digital payment methods: “With their strong scores for
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trajectory and readiness, our findings suggest that inception countries...will continue to shift
share at a rapid pace. This will be driven largely by government mandates to move benefits
payments and worker salaries to cashless solutions” (Thomas, 2014, p. 4). This statement
accurately captures India’s demonetization progress.
Transitioning countries are those in which cash transactions make up 80-90% of all
transactions. Mastercard cites Japan as a country which uses cash due to cultural preferences and
a high volume of ATMs. Brazil and China are cited as countries formerly in the inception
category which now, due to the rise of the middle class, have stimulated the growth of banking
and payment services. Spain’s high cash usage is due to a slow economy (Thomas, 2014, p. 2).
Next are the tipping point countries. These are countries where a shift to cashlessness
may be in the near future, but the “people must make the choice to change.” Again, cash in these
situations is preferred because of a lack of cashless solutions, cultural factors, and local
economics “conspiring to keep cash in the lead” (Thomas, 2014, p. 3). Finally, advanced
countries are those in which digital payments are available and most people have debit cards
which are accepted almost universally. Here, the benefits of paying with digital methods are
understood and cashlessness is growing.
To solve the problem of cash-intensive national economies which prefer cash for cultural
reasons, Mastercard offers the suggestion of “ educating consumers on the benefits of going
cashless” (Thomas, 2014, p. 5). However, even in countries such as Japan, which have the
digital infrastructure and banking systems to be cashless, cash reigns supreme due to cultural
factors. Japan is an example of how cultural factors can impact a nation’s economy. The Prime
Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, wants to increase smartphone-based payments in Japan, but he
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has been met with a significant amount of criticism. ATMs are efficient and prevalent on
Japanese streets, which makes cash a daily convenience. Cash usage in Japan has doubled
recently, partly due to a new policy, which created negative interest rates on deposits. Japanese
banker Daisuke Yamada at Mizuho Bank has compared the introduction of cashlessness to the
US warships that forced Japan to participate in international trade in 1853, a clear comparison to
the aversion of outside influence on Japan. To stretch this theory globally, cashlessness could be
interpreted by other countries as an outside, colonial concept forced upon them.
Culturally, cash is perceived as the perfect way to stay within a budget since digital
payments may allow consumers to overspend. In addition, there are worries across cultures of
consumers’ financial data and information about their spending being sold for marketing
purposes. A cultural aversion to online scams creates wariness about being tracked by companies
as well as having private information stolen. Lastly, cash is the “back-up plan when electronic
systems go down”. The ATM Industry Association is quoted as saying that they support “the
peaceful co-existence of cash and cashlessness so there is maximum choice and convenience for
all citizens” (Obe, 2017).
While the Better than Cash Alliance group advocates for the proliferation and inclusivity
of digital payment methods, conversely, the Cash Matters group advocates for the coexistence of
cash and digital payments based on consumer convenience. Cash Matters is an alliance of the
ATM Industry Association, the European Security Transport Association (ESTA), the European
Intelligent Cash Protection Association (EURICPA), Intergraf, an organization which represents
European printing and security printing industries, and Ja Til Kontanter, a pro-cash Norwegian
interest group.
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Cash Matters, unlike the Better than Cash Alliance, works to promote the use of cash
through statistics. They state that cash is more inclusive and believe in an economy in which
cash and digital payment methods can thrive simultaneously depending on the consumer’s
convenience (“Cash Alliance—About Us & Our Partners,” n.d.). It is important to note that both
Cash Matters and the Better than Cash Alliance believe in the same concept of inclusivity that
cash and digital payment systems bring, though Cash Matters advocates for both based on
consumer preference. Interesting, too, are their different partners. The Cash Matters partners hail
from security, printing, and ATM backgrounds, while the Better than Cash Alliance Partners
variety of partners come from government, banking, credit card, and other sectors. It certainly
seems the odds are stacked against the proliferation of cash in today’s world.
Yet in India, cash still rules despite Modi’s 2016 demonetization efforts. While there was
a drop in cash use post-demonetization, perhaps simply due to the unavailability of cash, cash
usage rose once ATMs were replenished with freshly printed 500 rupee and 2000 rupee notes. By
May 2018, the cash-to-GDP ratio had returned to levels seen pre-demonetization (Paliath, 2019).
Cash withdrawal at ATMs grew from Rs 1.1 trillion in January-March 2016 to Rs 1.4 trillion in
January-March 2018, a notable rise. Data suggests that cash demand rose because availability of
cash improved in the months following demonetization (Nayak, 2018). Looking at total cash in
circulation further proves the importance of cash in India: on April 6th 2018, the total cash in
circulation was Rs 18.4 trillion compared to 17.98 trillion a few days before demonetization.
This higher rate clearly shows that truly moving over to digital payment methods was not a
materialized goal by the RBI or the government. If these trends continue, rates of cash in
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circulation will be even higher in the coming years despite efforts to convert cash-loving citizens
to cards and payment apps.
The Indian government was betting on demonetization to work and for Indians to be less
reliant on cash. This did not happen, as evidenced by high rates of cash in circulation, demand at
ATMs, and harvest and election seasons that are still heavily reliant on cash flow (Dattagupta,
2018). The rapid adoption of payment apps seemed to give hope and credence to those in support
of a more cashless India, but the data show otherwise. Why has weaning Indians off cash been so
unsuccessful? Why does India seem to be so reliant on cash, despite efforts made to improve
access to banking and digital infrastructure, allowing for the widespread use of cards and apps?
First, vendors cite that there is a lack of demand for digital payment methods, leading to a
lack of point-of-service machines and even fewer vendors who actually accept cards or payment
apps. In a survey of over 1,000 merchants in Jaipur, Rajasthan, the University of California
found that low use of digital payments was not due to a lack of availability, but to low demand
because customers simply do not want to pay digitally. Connected to this are concerns that
consumers may be more liable to pay taxes if there are records of their payments. Those who did
adopt digital payment methods cite the fact that 80% of their transactions are still conducted
using cash (Paliath, 2019).
Cash is, quite simply, more convenient and habitual. It is anonymous in a country in
which citizens distrust the financial sector. Cash can be used anywhere, whereas some digital
payment services are still being adopted in certain areas. Cash is also accepted by everyone, from
the street vendor to the dudhwala who brings fresh milk door-to-door to shops in the mall. Cash
is tangible in the way that digital payments are not; when you have it, it is yours. Salil Tripathi,
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in his piece titled “Collateral damage of demonetisation”, writes that cash works even if the
power is cut or bank branches are closed; it does not force reliance on being in close proximity to
a bank branch, nor does it require a user to remember passwords. Cash works when cellphones
do not. He says, “cash is the language of transactions, with which you, and millions of others, are
used to conducting business daily”. Tripathi says that cash is preferred because there are no
functional alternatives, which is apparent when considering rising ATM usage and more notes in
circulation now than prior to demonetization. Ultimately, Tripathi sums it up simply “cash is
universally trusted and understood” (Tripathi, 2016).
Despite claims that there has been an uneven growth of digital payment acceptance, the
University of California survey shows that, at least in a decently well-connected city such as
Jaipur, this is not an issue. It is surely an issue in smaller, more rural areas. In Jaipur, however,
vendors are aware of digital payment methods. 98.6% of survey respondents had the documents
necessary for implementing digital payment methods, as well as the digital literacy and income
required for adopting point-of-service systems. Yet, only 42% had actually adopted digital
payments (Paliath, 2019). This is simply because accepting digital payments is not necessary to
maintaining customers or good business practices; customers find it easier and more convenient
to pay with cash.
In more rural areas, the infrastructure necessary to accept digital payment methods has
not kept up with the infrastructure already existing in the cities. There simply are not enough
ATMs or point-of-service systems in rural areas, and there are also issues with internet
connectivity and spotty wireless coverage. Even though India has an estimated 14 million
vendors, the number of point-of-service machines or devices is only 1.2 million; as a result, 90%
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of vendors have no medium to collect digital payments, though this number has likely grown
since demonetization (Jaleel, 2016). Even as the free digital platform Paytm implements
tantalizing incentives such as cash bank on purchases and free-credit card processing for vendors
(V. Goel & Raj, 2018), the data show that Indians continue to use cash in droves.
In addition to a lack of desire to use digital payment methods as well as a lack of
accessibility in some areas of India, many fear being cheated and losing money, or have worries
about a lack of security. Indians, unlike other citizens of developing countries, are not subjected
to the fear of carrying cash and having a thief steal it (Paliath, 2019). Rather, the fear lies in
distrust of digital payment companies. In an article for the New York Times, Ghani Khan stated
that Rs3,300 had been stolen from his Paytm account and not returned. This event led to a
distaste in and distrust of payment apps (V. Goel & Raj, 2018). Indian distrust extends to the
government, as will be covered later, but this has been apparent even prior to demonetization.
Upon the first announcement of demonetization, people ran to exchange cash into physical assets
in order to avoid government meddling in their business. The Economic Times reported that
“people still have greater trust in cash compared to digital transactions” (Pal & Herath, 2018, p.
3). Even those who have been forced to transition to digital payment methods have reverted back
to using cash now that the cash crisis has finished (Pal & Herath, 2018, p. 3). This preference for
tangible wealth is explained by the author of the University of California study mentioned above:
Bank accounts simply aren't that important to people who prefer to use cash in
transactions, and who store wealth in physical assets such as land, grain, or gold,”
Ligon said. “A preference for cash and physical assets makes sense if one doesn't
trust the financial sector, or the government, which plays such a large role in
regulating it, as in India (Paliath, 2019).
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Lastly, there is a financial barrier to digital payment methods. The poor may not have the
time to take off work to open bank accounts and maintain the minimum balance or even the
documents required to open an account in the first place. They may be treated badly at branches
if their balance is not up to standards, if they can even find a bank location that is accessible to
them. Smartphones are expensive, and digital payment apps require an amount of literacy- both
reading and financial- in order to use them. Thus, cash is the great equalizer.
In sum, cash is accepted by more vendors and is readily available. Cash works when cell
coverage is spotty or the power goes down, as it often does in many Indian locations. Cash does
not discriminate based on literacy level or social status. Everyone uses it, everyone trusts it, and
it is digitally unhackable. All in all, Indians prefer cash because it is easier to use, widely
accepted, and trustworthy when financial institutions and digital payments are not.
In contrast, Swedes find that cash makes its holders vulnerable to theft. They trust their
governments, as will be mentioned in the next section. Digital payments are more widely
accepted than cash, which many in Sweden report rarely using. Sweden has digital infrastructure,
digital literacy, and a preference for digital payment methods. All of these factors made the
transition to a nearly cashless society much easier for Sweden.
D. Political Culture
Government corruption is intertwined with Indian demonetization, but a lack of
government corruption in Sweden explains why demonetization in both countries was vastly
different. This section will compare perceptions of corruption and instances of bribes in each
country, and how this aspect of political culture affected demonetization.
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According to Transparency International, a non-government agency devoted to
monitoring global corruption, Sweden ranks 3rd as the least corrupt country in the world. In
addition to rank, Transparency International rates countries out of 100, with 100 being “very
clean” or nearly uncorrupt and 0 being highly corrupt. Sweden’s Corruption Perceptions Index in
2018 was 85, a number which puts Sweden just behind Denmark at 91, New Zealand at 90, and
ties it with Finland, Singapore, and Switzerland (“Transparency International—Sweden,” 2018).
In a survey about perceptions of public sector corruption, only 8% of Swedes believed their
public sector workers, such as police, elected representatives, government officials, to be corrupt
(Pring, 2017, p. 6) . This is one of the lowest rates in the world. In terms of bribery, less than 5%
of Swedish people paid a bribe when dealing with the public sector in the last month (Pring,
2017, p. 7). In a quote for the Guardian, associate professor of industrial dynamics at Sweden’s
Royal Institute of Technology, Niklas Arvidsson said, “people trust each other, the government
and the banks more in Sweden, plus we have very little corruption” (Russell, 2014). The data
backs up the sentiment of many Swedish people.
Bribery and government corruption are not problems in Sweden. Distrust of the
government may come from immigrant populations, but the majority are not worried. The
government is very integrated into cashlessness: several banks in Sweden no longer keep
physical cash on hand, and they charge quite a bit to cash checks. This has not been met with ire
in Sweden, but rather adaptation. A greater trust in the government implies that, had the Swedish
shift to cashlessness occurred as a government initiative, all might have gone well. As it was,
government responses to cashlessness in the private sector, such as charging higher rates to
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deposit checks or making public transit fare entirely digital, were accepted by the public with
little backlash.
In stark contrast are India’s rates of corruption and bribery. As of 2018, India ranks 78th
out of 180 countries with a score of 41 out of 100 (“Transparency International—India,” 2018).
This number has risen, implying less corruption as time moves on. In terms of bribery, between
50-75% of Indians reported paying a bribe to a public official within the last month, a number
that dwarfs Sweden’s rates (Pring, 2017, p. 7). Corruption in India is endemic; it is something
that has become a part of the everyday routine for most people. As Jauregui notes, corruption
“reflect(s) a cultural order in which activities that many would readily categorize as corruption
are collectively legitimated in everyday practice” (2014, p. 80).
Ironically, one of the goals of 2016’s demonetization was to fight corruption by opposing
political parties; Narendra Modi’s plan to demonetize would hurt his own party in terms of the
cash kept on hand for bribes or illegal money exchange, but damage his opponents’ parties much
more. Modi stated that the initiative was needed to root out terrorism and corruption by removing
black money when he said “cash in circulation is directly linked to the level of corruption”
(Padmanabhan, 2019). If his own words are to be heeded, then the higher amounts of cash
currently in circulation in India prove that his own initiative did not work. Following
demonetization, there were reports of even more corruption spurred by a need to pay higher
bribes (Bose, 2019, p. 44).
Bribery existed before, during, and after demonetization. Perhaps the method used to
fight terrorism, black money, and corruption, was itself corrupt. Talukdar writes, “when the tools
of cleaning a system are also corrupted, any effort at cleansing the system is likely to face
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resistance” (Talukdar, 2016). Thus, when a corrupt leader fights a corrupt system with even more
corruption, citizens are bound to resist in any form. This is why demonetization efforts have
worked in a nearly corruption-free country such as Sweden: the people had no reason to resist. In
India, corruption is such a widespread concern that it was impossible for a corrupt leader, whose
party was not trusted widely, to fight corruption on a meta level. When corruption and bribes
rule, following the rules seems fruitless and difficult, resulting in the chaos seen during
demonetization in which many attempted to bend the rules. When corruption and bribes are not
common, trust between the people and the government exists and rules are more easily
implemented and followed.
Political culture, preference for cash, jugaad, and uncertainty avoidance are several
cultural factors which underlie Indian and Swedish demonetization efforts. Uncertainty
avoidance explains how two very different cultures respond to the unknown. This leads us to
jugaad, an Indian concept rooted in using what one has to their advantage, even if that advantage
is not necessarily legal. Sweden does not work in quite the same way. The Indian preference for
cash is understandable given its unreliable digital infrastructure and attitudes toward keeping
tangible wealth. Corruption in India is very common and almost expected in all realms of
political and citizen life, while Sweden leads the world with its low rates of corruption and
bribery. Swedes trust their government; they have not been given a reason not to. Indians, on the
other hand, tend to err on the side of caution when it comes to fully trusting the government. All
of these factors are inextricably connected to each other in a web of cultural attitudes and
perceptions. These cultural factors clearly pinpoint how Sweden and India differ and thus how
they functioned prior to demonetizing, during, and after.
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2. Economic Factors
While cultural factors do largely determine a country’s response to an initiative like
demonetization, the event itself is, at its core, an economic issue. India and Sweden are fairly
different economically. Two economic factors that create great contrasts between India and
Sweden in terms of demonetization are the origin of change and income inequality. On one hand,
one country slowly demonetized over a period of time while the other demonetized overnight
following a government decree. One country is known for its equality, though that record may be
slipping today, and the other is unfortunately known for its inequality. These factors, when
applied to demonetization, illustrate how different India and Sweden are.
A. The Origin of Change
Sweden’s demonetization occurred as a result of greater technological innovation which
spurred the growth of digital payment methods and acceptance and adoption by the general
population, businesses, and public services. India’s demonetization was an order from the top,
resulting in chaos, efforts to avoid it, and change after change as an unprepared government
executed an ill-prepared policy on surprised people. The factor to consider here that sets Sweden
and India’s movements apart is the origin of change, or from where the demonetization directive
came. How does a top-down command compare to an initiative started by the people?
Because Indian demonetization originated with Prime Minister Modi and was a top-down
order from Prime Minister to the RBI and the Indian people, the country was pushed into chaos
due to a lack of coherence and communication between government agencies and actors. One
day, the bank was printing Rs500 and Rs1000 notes. Within hours they were told to suspend
printing, recall these notes, create replacement notes, and start exchanging them with the public.
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This notice from the top created immense problems for all Indians, but mostly the working poor
in the informal and farming sectors. An initiative that was better planned could have prevented
some of the problems that arose following the demonetization announcement, but the fact that it
was an authoritative decree from Modi deeply affected the people’s reception of the event.
Modi is no stranger to the title of authoritarian. He is commonly referred to as a
strongman in international publications and demonetization has only strengthened that image.
Economist Amartya Sen stated that demonetization was a despotic act and that “only an
authoritarian government can calmly cause such misery to the people.” (Belvedere, 2017). It is
indeed strange that the government and specifically the Reserve Bank of India, whose job it is to
protect people’s money, suddenly became untrustworthy and the source of financial distress. By
appealing to a variety of Indians for different reasons, Modi was able to reach into the minds and
pockets of Indians from different financial strata. Poor Indians never had much cash in the first
place, but now know Modi’s name and game. Middle-class Indians had been given a gift: their
richer or more corrupt counterparts would now be finally accountable for taxes and may lose
illegal savings. Modi showed his power by literally affecting the pocketbooks of every single
Indian citizen, regardless of whether or not they were playing by the rules. His popularity does
not seem to have been hurt by this initiative, despite its inefficacy (Coll, 2017). This gives more
credence to the theory that demonetization was simply a power move as opposed to an initiative
to truly fight the sources of illegal cash hoarding.
The origin of change being one man creates a myriad of problems. That man gained even
more power while simultaneously creating and perpetuating distrust in the financial sector. The
RBI lost credibility. A surprised populace was forced to reckon with immense changes and
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completely change their routines and lives in order to comply with government regulations that
changed daily. Such a directive from the highest level of the Indian government created the
problems that followed demonetization.
In Sweden, the origin of change was the people and the market. Upon the introduction of
credit and debit cards and later payment apps, Swedes flocked to try the newest technologies,
perhaps based on a culture which values innovation and trying new things. Over time, the central
banks followed this trend by charging for checks to be cashed, revamping and investigating cash
itself, becoming cashless themselves, and eventually investigating the use of their own digital
currency, the e-krona.
In stark contrast to India, Sweden has not faced nearly as many issues implementing
digital payments or exchanging cash. The fact that the decision was made by the majority of
people made it more likely that they would accept and proceed with the change. The decision
making from the people to the government, rather than the government to the people, created
vastly different results in Sweden and India. Were India more prone to using digital payment
methods anyway, demonetization might have been successful. However, given India’s cultural
attitudes and lack of Internet, smartphone, and bank account access, demonetization was a long
way away from being a natural evolution. Thus, when sprung upon the people, the results
involved many attempts at trying to go around the law as well as a lack of general support for the
movement.
In sum, the origin of change regarding demonetization was totally different in the cases
of India and Sweden. As a result, this caused major problems with following the decree in India
and created a sense of authoritarianism directed at Narendra Modi. The change in Sweden came
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from the people up to the government. This democratic change reflects the attitudes Swedes have
towards the government and their democracy, one in which everything works for the people. Had
the origin of change in India been from the people, demonetization would have happened
entirely differently. However, given India’s lack of infrastructure in certain areas to fully commit
to demonetization as well as cultural attitudes towards corruption, cash, and making do with
what one has, demonetization was highly unlikely to occur as a people-driven movement.
B. Income Inequality
Income inequality is an economic factor that extends to many different parts of a
country’s economic and cultural landscape. Income inequality reveals information about the
economy and gender roles. Sweden’s more equal society can be linked to its current economic
climate in that many people are in the same proverbial boat: most people view each other equally
and are on the same page when it comes to finances. This extends to gender performance in the
economy. India, on the other hand, has the second-highest rate of income inequality in the world,
just following South Africa (“Gini Coefficient By Country 2019,” 2019.). India, too, is a society
in which gender equality remains weak socially and economically. Income inequality and the
corresponding social striation created a response in India that allowed for demonetization in the
first place as well as the response to it by those who were affected.
First, Sweden and India could not be more different when it comes to inequality based on
income, though Sweden’s income inequality rates have been rising in recent years. This can be
measured by using the Gini index or Gini coefficient, which is a measure of economic inequality.
Sweden tops the world with one of the lowest Gini coefficient index rates: with a population of
over 10 million, Sweden has a rate of 24.9. In Gini coefficient terms, a number closer to 0 means

51
a nation is more equal. India’s Gini coefficient is 35.2, higher than Sweden, but a far cry from the
most unequal country, Lesotho, at 63.2. A number closer to 100 indicates high rates of inequality
(“Gini Coefficient By Country 2019,” 2019).
While Sweden’s economic inequality is relatively low due to a substantial social safety
net and a more egalitarian system, it has been growing due to the introduction of regressive tax
reforms on the wealthy as well as higher rates of poverty brought on by the acceptance of waves
of refugees or other people who were born abroad. In fact, Sweden has had the highest rate of
income inequality growth among all OECD countries and the proportion of Swedes at risk of
poverty has been growing at one of the fastest rates in the European Union (Nilsson, 2018).
Those earning at the top have benefitted from rising house prices and deregulation of the stock
market, seeing their earnings rise by 60%, while those at the bottom saw an increase of only 20%
(Mohdin, 2017). Those who were born in Sweden are at far less of a risk to fall into poverty than
their foreign-born peers, at rates of 13% to nearly one-third of foreign-born Swedes (Nilsson,
2018). This may be due to lower education rates, lower language skills, or the difficulties that
arise when integrating into a very culturally and ethnically homogeneous society such as
Sweden. Despite growing rates of income inequality, Sweden still leads the pack.
As of 2018, Sweden ranks 3rd in the world in terms of gender equality. Sweden’s parental
leave policy is the most generous in the world, allowing parents 480 days paid leave with the
birth or adoption of a child. In 2016, ministerial positions in the government were filled equally
by males and females (“These 4 Nordic countries hold the secret to gender equality,” 2018).
High rates of gender equality have been directly correlated with income equality. A study
by the World Economic Forum found that an increase of 1 point in gender equality indices is
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positively associated with increases in Gini coefficient rates of almost 10 points. Gender
inequality affects the economy with the wage gap primarily, as this contributes to income
inequality. Labor force gender gaps create earnings inequality, which makes income inequality
even worse. In addition, women are more likely than men to work in lower-earning informal
sector jobs and have fewer opportunities in terms of access to education, health services, and
financial services (Jain-Chandra, 2015). This creates strong inequality socially and economically.
India is an example of a country where gender and income inequality collide with drastic
results. While India’s Gini coefficient seems low at 35.2, the data speak differently, perhaps due
to such a high population. In 2017, 73% of the wealth created in India went to 1% of the richest
Indians. 67 million poor Indians saw only a 1% growth in their wealth. Between 2000 and 2018,
the number of billionaires in India rose from 9 to 119, with more projected to grow in the future.
In 10 years, billionaires’ wealth grew ten times, surpassing the entire budget of the Indian
government. 63 million Indians become impoverished each year due to medical expenses. It
would take 941 years for the average minimum wage worker in India to make what a top
executive earns in one year (“India,” 2019). These statistics illustrate the stark contrasts that
income inequality bestows upon average Indians. Gender inequality in India is even worse.
India ranked 130 out of 146 in 2016 in the Gender Inequality Index issued by the UNDP, and
violence against women in India continues to rise (Jayaraman, 2017).
Another index to look at is the Fragile States Index. The Fragile States Index created by
the Fund for Peace measures a state’s fragility based on twelve factors, including economic,
political, security, and social points that can indicate a nation’s strength or weakness. At one end
of the spectrum, implying an extremely fragile state that may be engaged in or on the brink of a
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civil war, are countries such as South Sudan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. On the opposite end are
Nordic countries, including Sweden, and Singapore. A high score indicates higher fragility, while
a lower score indicates more stability. India’s fragility has increased from a ranking of 93rd in
2006 to 74th in 2019. In 2006, their score was 70.4. In 2019, it was 74.4. A higher score
indicates increased fragility. This trend can be attributed to rising income inequality, human
flight and brain drain away from India towards North America and Europe, the demographic
pressures that occur with a booming population, and issues with security and state legitimacy
(Kar, 2019). However, India’s position has improved slightly since 2016, increasing from 70th in
2016 to 74th in 2019. Still, in comparison, India remains a relatively fragile nation with sharp
rates of uneven development. Where Sweden’s uneven development indicator score is 1.5,
India’s is 6.4 (“Country Comparison,” n.d.). Internationally, Sweden ranks at the bottom of the
Fragile States Index at 170th place out of 178, mostly due to the increased pressure refugee and
migrant populations have had on the small, Nordic nation (Fragile States Index, 2019).
It is important to look at this quantitative, aggregated data. The Fragile States Index
allows for various factors to be considered that contribute to inequality. Such factors collected
over the years indicate trends that fully illustrate the whole picture of inequality. For example,
Sweden’s rise in the number of refugees and internally displaced people is reflected in the data
that correspond to the rise in income inequality. While India on a whole has falling rates of
income inequality versus previous years, it is certainly higher there compared to many other
nations, especially Sweden. This leads to increased tensions in the country. There is another
factor in India, which, though not necessarily and economic factors, affects the economy due to
pervasive cultural ideologies.
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Compounding the issues of economic class and social class in India in particular is the
issue of caste. Caste, as perceived in India, does not exist in Sweden. While Sweden does have
social stratification between native-born Swedes and foreign-born Swedes, the issues are being
addressed via government programs and initiatives. These issues are new, spawned by very high
spikes in refugee migration to Sweden. There is anti-immigrant sentiment in Sweden, but this is
simply incomparable to casteist sentiments in Indian society.
The caste system in India, while technically illegal today, has been practiced by Hindus
for centuries. The caste system is a closed system of stratification, meaning that a person is born
into their caste and cannot change it. Meanwhile, caste controls access to income and services,
often leaving those who are lower-caste with unequal access to power (Deshpande, 2010, p. 12).
Caste certainly adds an element to income inequality. Dalits, considered the lowest-caste
individuals, were particularly affected by demonetization, as they make up a significant part of
the informal sector, which was deeply hurt following the cancellation of the Rs500 and Rs1000
notes. Simultaneously fighting against political parties pandering to them for votes and fighting
against the system itself, Dalits in recent years have had to fight the advance of Hindu
nationalism in addition to their daily battles for equal rights (Kandasamy, 2019).
Between 2002 and 2012, income inequality based on caste rose substantially. It also rose
within castes, triggering demands by certain designated ‘forward caste’ groups such as Jats and
Patels to be given reservation benefits, the benefits usually reserved for lower-caste individuals
that ensure equal access to education and government jobs. This is indicative of competition for
resources, or in this case, job and education access (Bharti, 2018, p. 29). Bharti writes that the
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economic growth of lower castes is stable or declining, and suggests that fighting economic
inequality in India may be a cover for fighting issues of caste inequality (2018, p. 49).
Thus, India has to grapple with the issue of caste in addition to fighting problems with
income inequality. Neither of these issues are present in Sweden; caste is something uniquely
Indian. While income inequality and the corresponding social striation are huge issues in India,
in Sweden these issues are just now coming to the fore. Income inequality and caste shaped
India’s response to demonetization: it gutted the informal economy and set many poor, often
lower-caste individuals back monetarily. Demonetization in Sweden has affected the elderly and
foreign-born, but their total economic upheaval has yet to be seen and, if it occurs, it will likely
be addressed and corrected by the Swedish government. Income inequality in Indian and
Swedish society alternately affected demonetization in both countries.
3. Comparison1
Demonetization in India and Sweden differed for a variety of reasons. How did they
compare? Only one factor jumps out: with increased access and availability of technology in
both countries, demonetization came into the picture as a potentially viable option. Where
Sweden had the infrastructure, digital literacy, and willing population to incorporate
demonetization into residents daily life, India did not.
Demonetization, even partial conversion of those who regularly use cash to become more
frequent users of digital payment methods, seems to be considered a natural progression of a
country’s economy. First comes a cash-based society and then, eventually, digital payment
methods rule and cash is no longer required. As evidenced by the Better than Cash Alliance and
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Please see the table on page 60 for a comparison between Indian and Swedish demonetizations.
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especially members Mastercard and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, cashlessness seems
to be the goal. Their own person stake cannot be disregarded and in a dominantly capitalistic
world, it's not a surprise that private corporate interests are curious to see how they can benefit
from demonetization around the world.
Clearly, the contrasts far outweigh the comparisons, but this is to be expected when
comparing two countries that are very different. Sweden is a more ethnically homogenous
country with a long history of technological innovation and a government that values social
safety nets. India has a history of colonization that they are still working on recovering from
coupled with tensions that exist between ethnic groups, castes, and religions. They are at two
different stages of development and contrasts are far more evident than comparisons. Regardless,
this deep dive into two very different demonetization efforts in two different places for vastly
different reasons is important due to its implications for future demonetizations in the future.
V. Implications
The information ascertained from this comparative study of the demonetization efforts in
both India and Sweden can be used as a way to ensure that future demonetization efforts are
different. From both studies, future orchestrators of demonetization can understand that their
efforts must be well planned and communicated to the people. It must be rolled out slowly so
that all residents understand the situation, the goals of the initiative, and how to exchange notes
in a timely manner. Future demonetization efforts must be inclusive of people from multiple
aspects of life: the elderly, illiterate, foreign residents, those living in poverty and others who
may be negatively affected by a change to their regular economic status.
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The bottom line is that demonetization or a cashless society is not necessarily a bad idea,
but its success is contingent upon a country’s individual cultural and economic environment. If
demonetization can truly work for everyone, it must not include a total elimination of cash or
non-digital payment methods. Overall, every aspect of demonetization must be looked into, from
the announcement, the size and design of the new notes and coins, the queueing system for banks
and ATMs to the repercussions for those already disadvantaged and the effects it may have on
local, domestic, and foreign economies years in the future.
VI. Conclusion
Demonetization is not a one-size-fits-all approach to drastically changing a country’s
economy- just because a few countries have been capable of almost fully demonetizing does not
mean that it can be applied in any situation. Demonetization takes on the specific traits of the
country’s cultural and economic factors, creating a new environment that, by nature, is exclusive.
India had a demonetization movement that did not emerge as a result of demand, nor was
it organized and highly publicized over a long period of time. Indian demonetization was sprung
on the people literally overnight. It caused chaos unlike anything imagined in Sweden, with
people dying in line, losing access to money they had kept stowed away, and an unprepared
government that changed limits and rules daily regarding the exchange of old notes for new. This
effort culminated in a fruitless attempt to convert people to more trackable and therefore taxable
forms of payment, as recently there has been an emergence of cash once again since the hype of
demonetization has died down. It has affected the Indian GDP and economic growth rates, to the
detriment to a growing democracy of over one billion people. While it may have come from a
place of seeking out tax evaders, forfeiters, and black money, the government has not seen the
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necessary results to justify the act of pulling a proverbial economic rug out from the feet of
billions, many of whom were the working poor and were deeply struggling before, struggled
through without getting paid from their informal sector jobs or dealing with the rising inflation of
food costs, and who may not have recovered yet from such a surprise overnight announcement.
In Sweden, a movement by the tech industry in the form of digital payment apps caught
on with younger folks. It was supported by the government, which viewed cashlessness as a
popular alternative to physical notes that leave banks, businesses, and busses vulnerable to theft.
This spawned a change at the banks, which themselves became largely cashless and charged
higher amounts for those wishing to process deposits or withdrawals in cash and a complete
recall and redesign of physical money over a 9-year period. The quick adoption of these services
could be attributed to the immense trust Swedes have in their government and bank officials to
keep their data safe coupled with a culture which adopts new technology frequently. While
paying with cards or apps has become commonplace, those who are left out are the elderly or
newly-arrived immigrants who may have trouble using apps due to language or technological
illiteracy or the remnants of a cash-heavy culture in their home country.
Culturally, a difference in uncertainty avoidance scores seems to explain the vast
difference in responses to each country’s demonetization efforts: one is a culture in which if
something is broken, it must be fixed per law while the other is one in which bending to abuse
the system is the status quo. This led to the uniquely Indian idea of jugaad, the concept of
making do with what one has in any situation, whether it is appropriate or not. This concept
contributes to the prevalence of corruption and bribery in India, things which hardly exist in
Sweden. Indians have a preference for cash due to a cultural belief that wealth should be health
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in tangible things such as gold and cash. This explains both the prevalence of cash in Indian
society as well as the reversion back to cash after demonetization chaos diminished.
In terms of economic factors, demonetization in Sweden seemed to emerge from the
people to the government, while demonetization in India has been interpreted as a gesture by a
strongman down to the people in an effort to control the masses. Additionally, India has far
greater income inequality than Sweden, though its inequality has grown with the arrival of
refugees in recent years. In India, income inequality is exacerbated by the caste system,
something Swedish society does not have. This system prevents India from achieving its full
potential economically, as many are completely prevented from participating in certain areas of
society, thus inhibiting growth economically in a way that Sweden will not experience.
While similar in the fact that they both revamped their currency and cancelled old
banknotes, India and Sweden’s demonetization efforts had drastically different catalysts,
implementations, responses, and results. Due to various economic and cultural factors, not to
mention basic political and demographic differences, India and Sweden differed in regards to
demonetization. Both events have had unsavory effects on some members of the communities
who may already be socially disadvantaged. Through the comparison of these two cases of
demonetization, the underpinnings of what made each case successful may be understood and
studied in hopes that future demonetizations can be collaborative, inclusive, well-planned, and
beneficial.
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Table 1: Comparing factors which differentiate Indian and Swedish demonetization efforts
Origins

India

Impacts

Cultural

Economic

Cultural

Economic

Jugaad- a societal need and
expectation to adapt and
innovate affected India’s
implementation of
demonetization and
responses

Origin of Change- an
authoritarian, top-down
decision caused
widespread confusion and
chaos

Uncertainty Avoidancemedium low score allowed
for many to skirt around the
rules of demonetization,
forcing the government to
implement rule changes
frequently

Income inequalityhigh and growing,
causes tensions
between groups,
especially those
employed
informally

Income inequalityPolitical culture- bribery and correcting high income
corruption are high, causing inequality was later
distrust in the government
deemed a reason behind
demonetization
Uncertainty Avoidance- a
medium low score implies
high tolerance for the
unexpected and likelihood
of adopting new technology

Jugaad- many “made do”
with what they had; also
seen in bank lines as people
adapted to waiting for hours
to exchange cash
Preference for cashhoarding of legal Rs100
notes skyrocketed following
the announcement; cash
levels rose
post-demonetization
Political culture- high rates
of corruption and bribery are
commonplace

Sweden

Uncertainty Avoidance- a
low score implies a relaxed
attitude and high adoption
of new technology as well
as a willingness to adapt
laws if they do not function
properly
Political culture- low
instances of corruption and
bribery create an
environment of political
trust

Origin of Change- a
market-based initiative to
use digital payment
methods was eventually
adopted by the people and
then the banks and
government

Uncertainty Avoidance- a
low score allowed for
widespread adoption of
technology, mainly digital
payment methods
Political Culture- very low
levels of corruption and
bribery fostered acceptance
of demonetization and
responses to it

Income inequalitylow, but growing.
Caused some groups
to be left behind
following
demonetization
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